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Abstract: Focusing on Karl Jaspers' important reading of Plato, I make the case for the re-conceptualization of Plato as a
non-doctrinal philosopher, by means of phenomenological-existential readings of his dialogues related to contemporary
Continental thought. The essay builds upon Jaspers' largely overlooked phenomenological-existential readings of both
Plato and Socrates in relation to Platonic scholarship emerging from the contemporary phenomenological tradition. I
focus on a speculative interpretation of Jaspers' non-doctrinal Plato by analyzing four components of his prescient reading,
which is an invaluable historical and philosophical document of Platonic scholarship that precedes contemporary
Continental phenomenological approaches to Platonic interpretation by a span of more than three decades. The
unacknowledged presence of Jaspers' phenomenological understanding of Plato reverberates in the contemporary
phenomenological and hermeneutic scholarship focused on understanding Plato's non-doctrinal philosophical project.
Ultimately, I read Jaspers' unique analysis of Plato in its relation to the contemporary non-doctrinal Platonic scholarship
that is focused on questioning traditional analytic and doctrinal readings of Plato in order to learn how Jaspers' work
might contribute to future phenomenological analyses of Plato while upholding Jaspers' deserved recognition as a
philosophical pioneer in the field of phenomenological Plato scholarship.
Keywords: Jaspers' Plato; hermeneutics; phenomenology; Platonic dialogues; non-doctrinal Platonic readings;
philosophieren; fundamental knowledge; dialectic-as-dialogue.

It is difficult to date with accuracy the precise historical
emergence of what is referenced and gathered under
the general moniker "non-doctrinal" interpretations of
Plato and Socrates in contemporary scholarship, which
has been expressed in terms of, to provide but three
prominent examples, the "anti-mouthpiece" Platonic
reading,1 the "third way" of reading Plato,2 and the
1

J. Angelo Corlett, Interpreting Plato's Dialogues, Las
Vegas, NV: Parmenides Publishing 2005, p. 45.

2

Francisco Gonzalez, "A Short History of Platonic
Interpretation and the 'Third Way'," in The Third
Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies, ed. Francisco

"anti-idealist" approach.3 It will be beneficial to mention
two sources that might be said to represent early
manifestations of this developing trend in contemporary
Gonzalez, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers 1995, pp. 1-25, here p. 2. [Henceforth
cited as SHP] Gonzalez presents here a brief, concise
chronology of Platonic study that includes ancient
philosophers, analytic and hermeneutic interpreters,
and contemporary scholars seeking to challenge
traditions in doctrinal interpretations of Plato.
3

Sean Kirkland, The Ontology of Socratic Questioning in
Plato's Early Dialogues, Albany, NY: SUNY Press 2010,
p. xxii. [Henceforth cited as OSQ]

James M. Magrini, "Interpreting Karl Jaspers' "Phenomenological" Plato: Transcending the Bounds of the Doctrinal Scholarly Tradition,"
Existenz 12/2 (2017), 34-48
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Platonic scholarship, which challenge and break away
from the familiar traditional analytic approach to
reading Plato in terms of a doctrinal and systematic
philosopher. First, I bring attention to the 1988 anthology
of alternative essays on Plato and the dialogues edited
by Charles Griswold Jr.4 and second, I acknowledge the
collected writings of Hans-Georg Gadamer focused
exclusively on philosophical-hermeneutic readings
of Plato's dialogues.5 For it is interesting to note that
Gadamer writes on such issues as the hermeneutics
of facticity, finitude, and the nothingness at the heart
of the human condition, language, and all interpretive
activities; themes that contribute in part to inspiring
contemporary phenomenological readings of Plato in
the Continental tradition.
Besides OSQ, the other contemporary Continental
study that is referenced throughout, which represents
influential phenomenological studies of Plato's
dialogues—both works make no mention of Jaspers,
however—is Drew Hyland's Finitude and Transcendence
in the Platonic Dialogues.6 Already the reader should get
a feeling for the diversity of such Platonic scholarship
as introduced, because "non-doctrinal" readings
cannot be tightly organized into an academic "school"
of interpretive thought, that is to say, "non-doctrinal"
readings do not adhere to strict and unwavering
tenets of interpretation, nor do they adopt a common,
singular, or agreed upon methodology. Although
there is nothing resembling a codified, unified, or
systematized "non-doctrinal" conceptual or interpretive
framework to be applied across the field of scholarship,
they do demonstrate what might be called "family
resemblances." It is possible to understand some of
the shared concerns of this diverse group of scholars,
and this includes the more recent trend in this type of
evolving interpretive work, namely, phenomenological
readings of Plato and the dialogues, by attending to
the following common thematic issues where various
strands of scholarly interpretation might be said to
4

Charles Griswold, Jr. ed., Platonic Writings/Platonic
Readings, New York, NY: Routledge, 1988. [Henceforth
cited as PWR]

5

For example, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Dialogue and
Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutic Studies on Plato, transl. P.
Christopher Smith, New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1980.

6

Drew Hyland, Finitude and Transcendence in the Platonic
Dialogues, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995. [Henceforth
cited as FTP]
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converge:
First, knowledge of the virtues in the dialectic is
viewed as non-propositional in nature, as a form of
philosophical understanding which is displayed—or
better, instantiated—in praxis; second, philosophical
understanding of the virtues cannot be taught through
transmission, as from teacher to pupil (student) or from
speaker to listener; third, unlike the scientific method,
the dialectic-as-dialogue does not terminate in a final
and definitive result, it does not yield a final product
(ergon), neither is it transposable nor disposable; fourth,
the relation to truth that the dialectic establishes is always
limited because of the existential distance separating
a human being from full revelation of the Being of
virtue, due to the existential constraints of human
finitude; fifth, there is a positive and experienceable
philosophical element or content that, although eluding
expression in propositional terms, is nevertheless
present within the dialogues and must be drawn out
through interpretive efforts attuned to the relationship
between the dramatic form of the dialogue and its
philosophical content; and sixth, to systematize Plato
as a philosopher who embraces systematic doctrines is
to disingenuously reduce the complex depth and vast
scope of his philosophy.7
Although it is not vocalized in contemporary
non-doctrinal readings of Plato that emerge from the
Continental phenomenological tradition, nonetheless all
six of these tenets are being expressed and developed in
unique ways within Jaspers' readings of both Plato and
Socrates.8 My primary focus here is to elucidate Jaspers'
7

See James M. Magrini, Plato's Socrates: Philosophy and
Education, Cham, Switzerland: Springer Press, 2018.

8

Joanne Waugh, "Jaspers on Plato," in: Karl Jaspers: On
Philosophy of History and History of Philosophy, eds.
Joseph W. Koterski and Raymond J. Langley, Amherst,
NY: Humanity Books, pp. 69-81, here p. 69 [henceforth
cited as JOP]. My claim is that Jaspers' reading of
Plato has been neglected in the Continental tradition
focused on phenomenological-existential readings of
Plato's dialogues. Waugh makes the more dramatic
and sweeping claim that the many unique aspects of
Jaspers' interpretation of Plato from "his study of the
great philosophers," which Waugh believes crucial
to an understanding of Plato, receive "insufficient
recognition in most recent English-language Platonic
scholarship" (JOP 69). It must be noted that as related
to my current concerns, Waugh made this observation
in 2003. Her essay focuses on reading Plato through
the lens of philosophy as philosophieren. For Jaspers,
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unique non-doctrinal phenomenological reading
of Plato that precedes contemporary Continental
phenomenological approaches to Platonic interpretation
by a span of more than three decades.9 The essay is
divided into four sections: (1) Jaspers' conception of
philosophy as philosophieren from which inspiration is
drawn for re-conceptualizing Plato, (2) Jaspers' essential
claims used for grounding his non-dogmatic reading of
Plato, (3) Jaspers' view of fundamental knowledge that
is reminiscent of Platonic philosophy and the virtues,
and (4) the emergence of fundamental knowledge
through the unfolding of the dialectic-as-dialogue and
its potential implication for human transcendence as a
turning of the soul (periagoge) back to itself in a moment
of philosophical-ethical enlightenment.
Jaspers' Conception of Philosophy as
Philosophieren:
Inspiration for Re-Conceptualizing Plato
My analysis of Jaspers' phenomenological Plato is not
read through the conceptual lens of Jaspers' philosophy
of Existenz. Albeit, my speculative reading does embrace
key components of his philosophy as they are related to
philosophieren indicates that philosophy is a dynamic
process, which in an ever-renewed fashion works
toward deepening our understanding in communion
with others. As related to Jaspers' Platonic
interpretation, philosophieren denotes a life of inquiry
attuned by the knowledge that philosophy is openended and, because of its unique mode of inquiry, can
never provide definitive answers or solutions to the
questions it poses or the problems it confronts. Waugh
has contributed several studies of Plato that approach
the philosopher from a non-doctrinal perspective.
Her contributions are focused on the impossibility
of separating so-called "Platonic" philosophy (as a
system) from the context of the dialogues. I thank the
anonymous reviewer of this essay for bringing my
attention to this important commentary on Jaspers. I
also thank the editor for offering valuable suggestions
that contributed to greatly improving this essay.
9

Filiz Peach, "Phenomenology, History and Historicity
in Karl Jaspers' Philosophy," in Analecta Husserliana
LXXXX (2006), 45-64. Peach describes Jaspers'
relationship to phenomenology as being different from
both Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger: "The
place of Jaspers' phenomenology in his philosophy
is a complex issue. Although he uses the method of
phenomenology he does not consider himself as a
phenomenologist" (p. 45).

http://www.existenz.us

understanding Plato as a "non-doctrinal" thinker. The
anti-idealist non-doctrinal reading of Plato, takes aim
at the problem of a two-world metaphysics that has its
ground in a quasi-Cartesian philosophical view that
is anachronistically projected back onto Plato. Jaspers'
Existenz philosophy holds a view about "traditional"
metaphysics that is relatable, not to Descartes, but to
Kant. For Peach, Jaspers' conception of
transcending-thinking (transzendierenden Denken)...
mirrors the Kantian concept of reality and the self in
the sense that transcending is grounded in the world of
human experience,

and this indicates that Jaspers embraces a metaphysics
that appears to retain the dualist "distinction between
appearance (phenomenon) and the thing-in-itself
(noumenon)."10 Jaspers' view might also be said to harbor
the ontological difference—the difference between
the ontic and ontological. To embrace the ontological
difference, when challenged, in a way that is similar to
criticisms leveled against Martin Heidegger's use of this
distinction in Being and Time, as we find it in Theodor
Adorno, which gives the distinct impression of a
hypostatized concept of Being related to an object or
entity.11 The critique of the hypostatization of Being (The
Fallacy of Hypostatization) as it might be understood in
doctrinal readings of Plato's philosophy, manifests itself
in the belief that the Forms (eidoi) can somehow become
proper objects of a form of knowledge that is sure and
certain. And, if it is possible to produce a definitive
account of the Forms in toto, then this would indeed
speak of a legitimate doctrine of forms in Platonic
philosophy, the very notion that is challenged within
Jaspers' non-doctrinal scholarship.
To further explore this issue, when the hypostatized
notion of Being is understood in terms of objective reality,
it can only be grasped through objective knowledge.
This understanding in Platonic scholarship, as Waugh
points out, restricts philosophical knowledge to
prevailing knowledge and, in highly reductive terms,
links the entirety of "Platonic thinking with prevailing
knowledge" (JOP 73). This view radically closes off a
phenomenological understanding of Plato, for the initial
10

Filiz Peach, Death, "Deathlessness" and Existenz in Karl
Jaspers' Philosophy, Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University
Press 2008, pp. 45-6. [Henceforth cited as DDE]

11

Theodor Adorno, Jargon of Authenticity, transl.
Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will, Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1973.
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appearing of the virtues to Socrates and his interlocutors
are labeled spurious, and worse, discounted as mere
appearances, when virtues manifest as opinions and
beliefs (as the doxastic requirement of the dialectic, as
for example in, "tell me what you believe about virtue
x") that are crucial for getting the dialectic started.
As Sean Kirkland points out, such appearances are
separated from the objective realm of true Being since
the "‘independence' of the object from our initial human
reception of it will almost certainly be taken to entail a
separation of being from appearing" (OSQ 18). Just from
these brief remarks, it is clear that by attempting to read
Plato directly through the conceptual lens of Existenz
philosophy one risks the potential dangers associated
with reconfirming the traditional metaphysical aspects
of Plato's philosophy that contemporary non-doctrinal
Platonic scholarship seeks to challenge and put into
question. However, recognizing this potential problem
as outlined, there is a way to accept along with Jaspers
that there are existential-transcendent aspects of human
existence that can nevertheless be experienced in a
legitimate manner without falling victim to the critique
of a two-world metaphysics, despite their ineffable
nature of always exceeding the human's limited form
of understanding. When talking of Being in relation to
Jaspers' reading of Plato, the existential can be conceived
as inseparable from its manifestations which indicates,
when this perspective is linked to a phenomenological
understanding of Plato, that the initial appearance of
the virtue that is questioned and clarified in the context
of the dialectic is inseparable from the Being of virtue,
as its presence manifests in obscure ways in daily life
with varying degrees of intensity.
The understanding of Jaspers' conception of
philosophy and its task are crucial in approaching a
non-doctrinal re-conceptualization of Plato. Authentic
philosophy for Jaspers is philosophieren, which indicates
that philosophy is an activity rather than a coherent set
of organized doctrines or dogma, for it resists the drive
to produce a "body of didactic principles purporting to
be definitive and complete."12 Jaspers emphasizes the
"on-the-wayness" of philosophy in its ever-renewed
dynamic unfolding, through which the deepest
existential possibilities for a human's Being-in-theworld might be revealed. Two sources of philosophy
12

Karl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom: An Introduction to
Philosophy, transl. Ralph Manheim, New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press 1954, p. 12. [Henceforth cited as
WTW]
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that are crucial for Jaspers as well as for Plato are wonder
and skepticism: Wonder inspires questioning, while
"man's doubt in the knowledge he has attained gives
rise to critical examination" (WTW 17). In its essence,
philosophieren searches for an authentic awareness of
the human condition, for an understanding of oneself,
others, and the world, and this occurs when we are
confronted by and respond to ultimate situations
(Grenzsituationen), the so-called existential "situations
which we cannot evade or change" (WTW 20), but when
responding to them, human lives hold the potential to
become meaningful in a variety of ways. As authentic
philosophers, we can never "forget that we must die,
forget our guilt, and forget that we are at the mercy
of chance" (WTW 20). Indeed, Plato's dialogues are
dramatic literary records of the philosopher's response
to ultimate situations in his efforts to understand
them. Philosophy is not about formulating theories or
devising calculative plans to confront such existential
situations, for true philosophy does not reside above the
human condition in a free-floating theoretical manner,
nor does it work out technical-empirical machinations
in response to the ultimate problems of life. Rather, in
an engaged mode of Being-in-the-world, as a necessary
life activity, task, and vocation, its essence is revealed
within our actual experience of living it and doing it,
and this is why philosophy for Jaspers, much like Plato,
is a process of "learning how to live" (WTW 125), which
is to say, learning how to question our living ideas in
such a way that within our discourse, aimed at the
revelation and communication of those ideas, thought
and praxis are inseparable.
The focus on discourse, as related to Plato and
the practice of the dialectic, bespeaks the ultimate
source of philosophy for Jaspers, namely, the "will to
authentic communication" (WTW 26), which embraces
and attunes us to all the other sources. Philosophy
occurs only in dialogue and through open-ended
communication where dogmatism and closedmindedness are eschewed, and only in sustained and
ever-renewed conversation is the manifestation of truth
possible. Truth, in terms of fundamental knowledge,
does not occur because of the process, rather it
happens as a possibility only within the process, for
the presence of the Being, "resides only in unreserved
communication between men who live together and vie
with one another in a free community," which indicates
that the practice of philosophy, as a life-project or task,
is a "loving contest in which each man surrenders his
weapons to the other" (WTW 26). Doing philosophy,
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as Jaspers understands it, as a communal practice,
holds the potential to inspire a sense of self-awakening
through self-understanding. Philosophieren recognizes
that authentic thinking occurs within a context that
seeks to establish a relationship with Being or what
might be termed the primal mystery within all things,
which at once envelops all things, and which is present
in ways that are obscured and oblique, in ways that
call for philosophy to attempt to elucidate it, to wrest
it from concealment, all the while working to preserve
and shelter that which must always remain "present as
mystery" (WTW 177).
According to Jaspers, the authentic philosopher's
task is grounded in the "unconditional imperative,"
which is an imperative that "precedes every aim, it is
that which determines all aims," and this indicates that
the unconditional imperative is not the object of the
will but rather "its source" (WTW 55). So monumentally
weighty is the unconditional imperative that "it decides
the ultimate basis of a man's life, which determines
whether it is significant or meaningless" (WTW 57).13
This unconditional imperative is not innate to human
beings, and must be revealed "through lucidity that is
the product of reflection" (WTW 56), and when it makes
its presence known, a monumental decision must be
made with regard to its appropriateness for a given
task, in relation to one's inner Being, for it is identical
with one's disposition (hexis). This relates to Jasper's
reading of Plato, to the normative implications of the
13

Mike H. Awalt, "Writing the Disaster: Inscriptions
of the Self," in Death, Suffering, Identity, ed. Daniel
Primozic, New York, NY: Rodopi Press 2002, pp. 5-19,
here p. 9. Jaspers identifies Socrates as the "purest
example" of a person embracing the unconditional
imperative and living under its directives, making
"no concession" and refusing "to avail himself of the
opportunity for flight," thus dying "happy, staking
everything on his faith" (WTW 53). One needs only
to look at the Apology where Socrates describes to
the jury his life-task and vocation in the service
of the Delphic god. One can also find in Plato this
dedication to the unconditional imperative, for Awalt
makes the compelling case that Plato's entire life was
dedicated to "living the disaster," that is to say, doing
philosophy and writing as a rejoinder to the situation
within which he found himself in and against which
he struggled. It is possible to state that for Plato the
ultimate or unconditional imperative was living the
death of Socrates, for the "reality of Socrates' death
won't go away and must be written again and again"
(p. 9).

http://www.existenz.us

unconditional imperative, for the ultimate imperative
instantiates an awareness of self in terms of "what I ought
to be" (WTW 55), what I ought to do and, moreover,
what we ought to do. As opposed to remaining
immutable once it is discovered, the potential exists
through the philosophical life that the unconditional
imperative "can be transformed in rebirth" (WTW 56).
Indeed, the unconditional imperative is born, has its
origins, to return to the nature of true philosophy, out
of the desire to transcend one's present conditions, in
fleeting moments of partial enlightenment, and to
struggle in an attempt to change what we are in the
isolated and individuated moment of the present, with
an eye to both the future and beyond, what might
potentially be eternal and infinite. Since no discursive
logical arguments can be offered in defense of the
unconditional imperative, no categorical reasons exist
to demonstrate the necessity that we dedicate ourselves
to heeding its call and address, to place ourselves under
its charge and law, Jaspers claims that this requires from
the authentic philosopher—much like Socrates and
Plato—to follow "it in faith and awareness" (WTW 57).
The Platonic Standard, The Dogmatic Tendency:
Jaspers' Non-Doctrinal Approach to Plato
Both non-phenomenological and phenomenological
approaches to non-doctrinal Platonic interpretations
are traceable to the dichotomy initially emerging from
Diogenes Laertius (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers) in
terms of the false dichotomy between skeptical and
doctrinal readings of Plato. Francisco Gonzalez informs
us, Diogenes "tells us that an interpretation of a Platonic
dialogue must decide, among other things, whether
statements in it are meant to establish Plato's own
doctrines...or to refute the interlocutor" (SHP 5). The
skeptical reading is confined to the opinions of Socrates
and the interlocutors, and the reader should not take
these opinions as comprising any type of systematic
philosophical doctrine. This type of reading, which
is eristic in nature, yields no positive philosophical
content. The doctrinal reading, on the other hand, does
extract a definitive and positive message or content
from Plato's dialogues, but this so-called content is
possible only because Plato's philosophy is understood
as systematic or doctrinal in nature. Jaspers' disagrees
with both of these approaches to Plato, stating, with
respect to the skeptical reading: eristic discourse
that "serves no other purpose than to annihilate the
enemy is a very different matter from the discourse
Volume 12, No. 2, Fall 2017
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aimed at communication with a view to the truth."14
In relation to the doctrinal view Jaspers objects to the
interpretations by Eduard Zeller and instead cautions,
when attempting to reduce Plato's philosophy to the
"form of a comprehensive doctrine": we encounter a
host of irresolvable problems, not the least of which is
"destroying existing structures for the sake of a rational
system that can never be anything but imaginary" (PA
7). To elucidate a doctrinal reading of Plato, I turn briefly
to the scholarship of William and Mabel Sahakian
who demonstrate a paradigmatic exercise in rigidly
systematizing every aspect of Plato's thought.15
The authors' systematizing of Plato includes
the strict categorization of Plato's various theories or
doctrines of knowledge and reality expressed in terms
of epistemological essentialism (asserting a noetic grasp
of Plato's Forms by means of applying the dialectic)
and in terms of metaphysical dualism (doctrine of
the Forms or Ideas—reality versus appearance), both
of which affect how we view humans and the world,
and the ways of how knowledge relates to the world.
Sean Kirkland argues that what we encounter in such
a doctrinal reading is a quasi-Cartesian ontology or
worldview and epistemology projected back onto
Plato in an anachronistic manner (OSQ 11). Sahakian
and Sahakian also identify doctrines (for example the
Doctrine of Anamnesis) along with identifying an
essentialist theory of ethics and values, even in the
various myths in order to buttress their claims for a
doctrinal Plato. This poses a multitude of problems for
interpreters, given the ambiguity involved in Plato's
practice of incorporating myths together with reasoned
argumentation (logos). In such doctrinal interpretations
of Plato, the dialectic is embraced as a sure and certain
truth-divining method, which when applied with
philosophical acumen, ascertains and procures truth
that is beyond skepticism. The dialectic allows Socrates
to glean truth of the Forms (eidoi) and ultimately the
Idea of the Good (agathon) with categorical certainty, in
terms that are allegedly consistent with and expressible
through propositions.16 When embracing a doctrinal
14

Karl Jaspers, Plato and Augustine, transl. Ralph
Manheim, ed. Hannah Arendt, New York, NY:
Harvest, 1962 pp. 24-5. [Henceforth cited as PA]

15

William Sahakian and Mable Sahakian, Plato, Boston,
MA: Twain Publishing, 1977. [Henceforth cited as P]

16

See Francisco Gonzalez, Dialectic and Dialogue in Plato:
Plato's Practice of Philosophical Inquiry, Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press 1998, pp. 209-45.
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view of Plato's philosophy, one must, out of necessity,
either ignore or attempt to explain, in relation to a
unified and completed system or one in development,
the various dialogues of Plato that are aporetic in
nature and end in bewilderment, where the quest
for a trustworthy definition of the virtue in question
eludes Socrates and his interlocutors as we find in the
Republic Book I, Charmides, Laches, Meno, and Theaetetus.17
Contributing to this line of reasoning, Waugh argues,
when making the error of reducing philosophical truth
to prevailing knowledge, or the knowledge of objects,
we perpetuate "a view of language and philosophy in
which the fact that Plato wrote dialogues is irrelevant
to his philosophy and to knowledge" (JOP 77). For
Waugh, Platonism instantiates a "series of philosophical
commitments" (JOP 75) to such an understanding of
philosophy, that manifests in a systematic pursuit of
propositional or formable knowledge.
For Jaspers, there is an authentic Platonic standard
[Henceforth cited as DDP] In relation to the doctrinal
idea of propositional knowledge of the virtues,
Gonzalez also talks of a form of knowing that is
linked with the philosopher-rulers understanding
and practice of the dialectic in the Republic. When
the dialectician moves from the hypothetical
method of dianoia to glean truth in a moment of
noetic insight—when graduating beyond discursive
modes of inquiry—the first principles and socalled objects of intelligible thought are known with
axiomatic certainty, that is, with the unwavering and
unquestioned veracity of mathematical principles.
17

Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher,
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991. To use the
term "doctrinal" as related to Platonic studies includes
critical methodological approaches to interpretation
that emerge from developmentalist and unitarian
perspectives. The former holds that Plato's systematic
philosophy develops and evolves over the vast
corpus—which means that the historical-temporal
unfolding of Plato's writings instantiate, because
they chart, the development of the progressive and
ever-maturing system of philosophy. The latter one
indicates that a gradually developing philosophical
message or system emerging from the dialogues that
Plato's thought is unified—and hence organized and
systematized—and that each dialogue has its own
unique manner of presenting and revealing for the
reader aspects or components of that holistic and
unified view. The former type of doctrinal reading
is famously expressed in the scholarship of Vlastos
and the latter species of doctrinal interpretation is
embraced by Sahakian and Sahakian.
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of philosophizing that stands beyond the dogmatic
tendency in scholarship of systematizing Plato, and
he is unequivocal on this matter: "There is no explicit
system and no indication of the stages of Plato's
development," rather the sense of wholeness that
encompasses his thought is to be found in the act of
philosophizing itself, which "pervades the entire work
and defies exact formulation" (PA 7). For Jaspers, Plato's
philosophy is a form of freedom that thinks and speaks
from out of an originary "scene of growing awareness,
not a communication of immutable truths," and hence
is never reducible to a system, and what remains true
throughout the dialogues Plato wrote, is that the "idea of
the enduringly true" resists codification and reification
within a set of definitive doctrines, for it "fundamentally
and essentially evades objective knowledge, direct
statement, or adequate formulation" (PA 49). As related
to the views of contemporary non-doctrinal Platonic
scholarship, Jaspers resists the interpretive

James M. Magrini

concealed, it recedes from full disclosure, and this is
why in philosophy's pursuit of arete, "its positions are
always changing" and the "ultimate answer is never
given" (PA 16).18 With this understanding of the openendedness of philosophical discourse, it is evident that
the good life is never at an end, always in the process of
being restructured and reinterpreted through ceaseless
questioning, and this, in one form or another, is what is
present to all the dialogues according to Jaspers: "What
is already present in the early dialogues runs through
the whole of Plato's philosophizing, whose power of
growth seems to know no limits" (PA 16).19 Indeed, what
18

Gregory Fried, "Back to the Cave: A Platonic Rejoinder
to Heideggerian Postmodernism," in Heidegger and the
Greeks: Interpretive Essays, eds. Drew Hyland and John
Manoussakis, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, pp. 157-76. [Henceforth cited as BTC] Within
Gregory Fried's phenomenological reading of Plato's
Socrates, the crucial distinction is made between
what Fried terms zetetic philosophy (to seek) and
echonic philosophy (to have), which consitutes the
marked difference between Socratic skepticism and
the idealized philosophy of the philosopher-rulers of
the Republic. Similar to Jaspers, Fried makes the case
for echonic or idealized imagery inspiring, keeping
alive, and driving on the zetetic and skeptical quest for
truth in Plato's philosophy. Here again, we find such
a notion expressed by Jaspers incorporating different
terms when he analyzes the so-called "Doctrine of the
Immortal Soul," informing the reader that Socrates,
from whom Plato drew profound influence, viewed
the idea of an immortal soul as an ideal from which
to draw inspiration for philosophizing and living.
The immortal soul is not based on rational proof, but
rather its acceptance represents the "'venture' of living
in hopes of immortality," worthy of our devotion for
"peace of mind demands such ideas," but Socrates
always guarded "against any certainty that might be
regarded as a possession conferred by knowledge." See
Karl Jaspers, Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus, transl.
Ralph Manheim, ed. Hannah Arendt, New York, NY:
Harvest Books 1962, p. 14. [Henceforth cited as SBCJ]
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Drew Hyland, Finitude and Transcendence in the Platonic
Dialogues, Albany, NY: SUNY Press 1995, p. 9. It is
this line of interpretive thought that moves away
from the strict division of the dialogues as found in
developmentalist readings, that is expressed in similar if
not identical terms by Hyland in his phenomenological
reading of Plato. Hyland claims that in every dialogue
the recognizable and indelible phenomenological
themes of finitude (limitation) and transcendence are
present and this contributes to the development of

tendency toward conclusive dogma, the shift from
fluid ideas to a congealed Idea of being, from a
playful reading of signs to an externalized objective
knowledge, from experimental thinking to the finished
product of thought. [PA 57]

Although drawing a distinction between early and
later dialogues, with the early ones drawing inspiration
directly from "the living Socrates" (PA 14), Jaspers finds
a consistent and unifying theme that runs throughout
the entire corpus of Plato's writings, namely, the manner
in which human excellence (arete), as it relates to the
ethical life, manifests itself within the dialectic. Arete is
not viewed as a destination toward which the dialectic
inevitably leads, in terms of an attainable end, but rather
as a philosophical ideal toward which those who pursue
knowledge of arete and self-awareness are directed. It
represents the "radiance of an excellence that shows
itself in contest," which is in essence the knowledge
that is revealed in the "actuality of thinking action," the
knowledge, or better, the fundamental knowledge, that
is one with the primal mystery and a human being's
character or disposition (hexis), of those "who act well,"
relates at once to the soul and what ought to be done as
an imperative of the good life (PA 14). It is this pursuit
of the ideal and perfected notion of arete that drives the
Platonic philosophical project, which thinks through
the inspiration it receives from this perfected vision of
arete, revealed in and through the fleeting light of Being,
while understanding that arete can never be brought to
full disclosure because its Being in its essence remains
http://www.existenz.us
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Jaspers observes about Socrates, who "was filled with
an awareness of his vocation" (SBCJ 7), might equally
be true of Plato, who lived in the "lucidity of his reason,
out of the Comprehensive of nonknowledge" and
ultimately dedicated his life through obedience to an
absolute imperative" in a way that won him "authentic
being as the foundation of his decisions" (WTW 53).
I briefly turn to Jaspers' unique non-doctrinal view
of the Forms (eidoi) or as he prefers, Ideas, in order to
demonstrate its stark contrast to the doctrinal reading.
The rigid two-world Platonic metaphysics upon which
the doctrinal reading depends, is ineluctably linked with
an ethics grounded in knowledge, exclusively related to
the realm of the intelligible Being (on) as opposed to the
realm of the perceptual or sensual Becoming (me on).
Here, the Ideas serve an ontological and transcendental
model or paradigm of reality that the terrestrial realm
instantiates or imitates. This indicates in a disingenuous
manner that in order to demonstrate arete and moral
excellence, knowledge of the Form or essence (Being)
of virtue must be acquired and possessed by the
philosopher in terms of certainty. In his non-doctrinal
reading, Jaspers observes that notions of Ideas manifest
in various ways throughout many of the dialogues,
"some of which run through the whole work from the
earliest dialogues, while others make their appearance
later" (PA 31).20 In one way or another, the Ideas play a
role in directing the philosopher's thought toward the
perfected and idealized realm of true Being (the realm
of the Ideas),
but their expression changes according to the manner
in which the search is communicated. When they
become fixated in a doctrine [it] creates insoluble
problems. [PA 31]
a deeper sense of understanding human excellence.
This opens the potential for an interpretation that in its
own unique way allows each dialogue to express these
themes while avoiding the rigid systematizing common
to the both the developmentalist and unitarian views.
20

Jaspers rightly points out, by turning to the Greeks,
that Plato employs a host of varying terms when
referencing the Ideas, contributing to their general
ambiguous nature or natures in relation to his
philosophy, for instance, "form (eidos), shape (morphe),
type (genos), essence (ousia), unity (monas, henas)."
Plato often is unclear as to what is included in the
"world of Ideas, of whether everything which in any
way is also has its Idea" (PA 30), such as living things
like human beings or horses and manufactured items
or artifacts such as tables or beds.
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Hyland points out that for Plato's unending pursuit
of the ethical life and the virtues, as it is concerned with
the realm of the normative, the Ideas can be imagined
as "principles of intelligibility" (FTP 165-95), in terms of
inspirational visions or idealized vistas into the Being
of virtue, which propel forward the philosopher's
pursuit of arete. There is one consistent notion that can
be drawn from Jaspers complex interpretation of the
Ideas without lessening their import within Platonic
philosophy, namely, Plato's philosophy instantiates
the drive to conceptualize a thing's unity, clearly a
response to the Pre-Socratic problem of the one and
the many, that underlies the Ideas, for instance, "the
individual horse perishes but the concept of the horse
endures" (PA 31) and, as importantly related to ethical
concerns, despite the various manifestations of virtue in
particular situations, there is an Idea of virtue that gives
unity, as a principle of intelligibility, to the manifold
ways that virtue comes to presence. Since we do not
have a proper logos available to bring the Ideas to stand
in thought and language with categorical veracity,
Jaspers claims we should turn to the metaphorical and
even poetic language Plato incorporates, which is best
suited for attempting to describe the Ideas, for it offers
an intimation of and pathway into something that can
perhaps inspire and point us in the direction of such
Ideas as a perfected form of reality and potentially
keep our "gaze fixed in that direction" (PA 30). Since the
existential-transcendent realm defies communication
via traditional modes of communication and its being
beyond reasoned argumentation and syllogistic
logic, the Ideas are "adumbrated in metaphors and
concepts" (PA 29), and here it is possible to add to
metaphors and concepts, myths and the hypothetical
thought experiments of Socrates.21 Although such
communication might confuse, or appears to be arcane,
"it is just this absence of finite clarity that gives us an
intimation of something that cannot be communicated
in any other way" (PA 30).
Fundamental Knowledge: Knowledge that is
One with the Reality of the Knower
In their doctrinal reading of Plato's Republic, Sahakian
and Sahakian claim that once dialectic argumentation
21

Jean-Francois Mattei, "The Theater of Myth in Plato,"
in Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings, ed. Charles
Griswold, Jr., New York, NY: Routledge 1988, pp. 6683, here p. 67.
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passes beyond the mode of discursive reasoning and
the hypothetical method, the illustration of truths
through images is no longer required; in this approach,
a diagram or allegory "ascertains the truth as it really
is" (P 122). The movement through the Divided Line, a
graded hierarchy of forms of knowledge, levels of their
reliability, and realms of their respective intelligibility
(intellectual/perceptual), is the educative "passage from
the natural world of sense to the ultimately real world
of thought, that is, from appearance to reality," whereby
the knowledge of the "Good is attained through
dialectic intuition" (P 122). There are metaphysical,
epistemological, educational, and ethical issues bound
up with the doctrinal reading of the dialectic, which are
problematic and traceable to the understanding of the
dialectic as a truth-divining (noetic) method that destroys
the philosopher's use of and dependence on hypotheses
(dianoia) and puts the dialectician in direct intellectual
contact with the Idea of the Good. The authors state
explicitly that when the mind makes "direct contact
with the Platonic ideals and the Good," reaching a state
of knowledge that is "absolutely true and enduring" (P
148), the hypotheses are disposable because they are
"no longer required in perfect intellection or dialectic
knowledge" (P 151). The foregoing interpretation is
problematic for those espousing the doctrinal position,
for it ignores that Plato's Socrates has little if anything
to say about exactly how this form of instruction in the
dialectic actually transpires or about how the desired
results are supposedly achieved, and in the Republic,
from whence this doctrinal reading originates, Plato's
Socrates actually denies that such epistemological
results are even possible.
In this view, as against that of Jaspers' interpretation
of Plato's practice of philosophy, the understanding of
both the dialectic and its effectiveness along with the
type of knowledge or truth that might be associated
with the virtues in Platonic philosophy is questionable.
Stated succinctly, a doctrinal reading wrongly
categorizes the dialectic as a disposable method that is
applicable within and transferable to many situations.
It is also problematic to claim that the dialectic is a
successful method for acquiring and hence possessing
intellectual insight (noesis) or certainty about the truth
of the First Principles, which enables philosopher
rulers to deduce from these principles the eidoi of the
individual virtues that Socrates talks of, such as justice,
courage, piety, sophrosune, and wisdom. This gives the
disingenuous impression that the dialectic produces
a product (ergon) that stands outside the (poietic)
http://www.existenz.us
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process of its unfolding through the elenctic dynamic of
question-response-refutation. A doctrinal reading also
endorses an erroneous interpretation of Plato, ascribing
to the philosopher the belief that knowledge of virtue is
like a techne, or form of technical knowledge, and hence
can be acquired and possessed and then passed along
through transmission. This is not the case, for this is
neither a view of philosophy, nor of dialectic, nor does it
pursue a form of knowledge that either Jaspers or Plato
endorses. Jaspers makes this clear for his readers when
he articulates that fundamental knowledge associated
with the virtues in Plato, "cannot be taught in the same
way as the knowledge that is a means to an end" (OSQ
34).22 Jaspers contends that fundamental knowledge is
inseparable from the type of dialectic-thinking that Plato
advocates and describes in the dialogues. Jaspers links
fundamental knowledge to the revelation of Being or,
what might be understood in relation to Jaspers' Plato,
the primordial mystery that is inherent in all things.
Such existential insight into the Being of arete does not
possess a definitive instrumental value and, as stated, is
never reducible to "formable knowledge" or to "dogmas
and articles of faith" (WTW 12).
Several characteristics of the fundamental
knowledge of virtue can be drawn out from Jaspers'
analysis: Fundamental knowledge is irreducible to
propositional discourse, in that we cannot capture and
hence possess the reality or the very Being of the virtues
in an objective manner, stating definitively, "Justice is x"
"Courage is y," or "Sophrosune is z," which is to say, the
original Socratic question, ti esti; this indicates "What is
it?" in transliterated Greek, finds no definitive response,
arrives at no complete state of closure, refuses to
terminate in propositions, because it is always on-theway. Fundamental knowledge is non-propositional in
nature and might be said to be manifest and revelatory
as opposed to describable or explainable, as there is no
object that can be explicated with the sense of clarity
and certainty associated with propositions—techne and
episteme—for that which "by its very nature is essential
refuses to be fixated in doctrine, for in such fixation it
would be lost" (PA 21). Fundamental knowledge might
be said to be manifest and neither fully describable nor
explainable because it shows itself as it is demonstrated
22

Kirkland's phenomenological conclusion aligns with
that of Jaspers regarding the knowledge of the virtues,
for human wisdom of arete is "nothing other than the
acknowledgement of not having a techne-like grasp of
virtue" (OSQ 77).
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in praxis as it emerges from and hence provides insight
into our ethical disposition (hexis) to act in one way or
another, and this occurs in the very act of questioning the
virtues and, ultimately, in the authentic life dedicated
to the philosophical pursuit of arete. Jaspers talks of
fundamental knowledge illuminating the way of Plato's
philosophical thinking, in that it arises or manifests as
we traverse the path directed toward understanding the
ethical life, while it simultaneously illumes or lights the
entire philosophical journey (DDP 1-20).23 Indeed, the
essence of Platonic thinking in relation to fundamental
knowledge is an "orderly speaking in questions and
answers in the hope of finding a path upon which the
final illumination provides guidance without becoming
an object" (PA 17).
Indeed, this is the reason why Plato in Letter
VII goes to great lengths to explain that the so-called
content of his philosophy, which of course in essence is
the concern for pursuing and interrogating the virtues
and the understanding thereof in search of the ethical
life, defies description and explanation like other
subjects, for fundamental knowledge of the virtues
manifests and is revealed in a practice mirroring Jaspers'
philosophieren when "living with the subject itself in
frequent dialogue, as a light kindled from a leaping
flame, comes to be in the soul [disposition] where it
presently nourishes itself" (341 c-d).24 When pondering
the type of thought and knowledge associated with the
pursuit of Plato's philosophical project, Jaspers asserts
that it is "not essentially an acquisition of something,"
but instead an originary "soaring of one's own being:
with this knowledge man is transformed" though
a mode of attunement (Stimmung) that instantiates
a change to or "turning around" (periagoge) of the
disposition (hexis), transformed as it is "guided by
whatever is revealed in thought," and this occurrence,
the moment when knowledge nourishes the soul, is the
"basic trait of philosophical reflection from Plato" (PA
23

It must be noted that in Platonic scholarship the
recognition and analysis of non-propositional
knowledge of the virtues in Plato's dialogues receives
the most thorough treatment in the writings of
Gonzalez. In light of and inspired by Gonzalez's
dramatically original reading, I have sought to
draw out the phenomenological elements of such
an interpretation as they might relate to Jaspers'
phenomenological understanding of Plato.

24

Plato, "Letters," in Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper,
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 1997, pp.
1634-1676, here p. 1659.
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19). The event of periagoge is a moment (Augenblick) of
change, attunement, and enlightenment that nourishes
the soul or disposition and strengthens the bond and
relationship between logos and bios. Here, logos, refers
to the ever-renewed pursuit of fundamental knowledge
of the virtues as this pursuit instantiates and defines the
philosophical and therapeutic project of care for the
soul, which is the ethical life (bios) for Plato.
This indicates, in a radical manner, that in the
pursuit of virtue, human beings instantiate virtue, for
in the "fundamental knowledge of justice [humans]
become just" (PA 20). Jaspers points out that in
the presence of fundamental knowledge there is a
relationship established between the will to do good
and the knowledge that inspires our fundamental drive
to act, to deliberate and choose well, in an essential
understanding and attunement of arete. Fundamental
knowledge of the virtues occurs only in dialogue,
within a community. Since there is a transformation
(periagoge) to one's Being or disposition, there is
an undeniable connection between fundamental
knowledge and self-knowledge or self-awareness.
In proximity to the notion of periagoge that I develop
here, also Waugh recognizes that in the presence of
fundamental knowledge "one is transformed by the
knowledge one gains; consequently it is a process which
never reaches certainty nor a conclusion," and although
"we do not acquire this knowledge—perhaps because
we do not acquire this knowledge—it transforms us"
(JOP 76-7). For fundamental knowledge "is always in
motion" and it is a "knowing that is one with the reality
of the knower" (PA 44-5), and hence in addition to the
undeniable practical (phroentic) element linked with
the unique understanding the virtues for Plato, there
is also a unique reflexive component to fundamental
knowledge. Jaspers stresses that knowing and being
oneself is most authentic when what is most one's
own is pursued, which occurs only in the drive toward
philosophia and the potential good that comes when
discoursing among non-competitive and like-minded
individuals concerned with administering therapy to
each other's soul. This notion of self-knowledge might
be related to the living Socrates' devotion to adhering
to the Delphic epigram, "Know thyself" (gnothi seaton),
for Socrates within his practice of the elenchus-dialectic
"does not hand down wisdom but makes the other
find it," by turning toward the self, and this indicates
that "each man must find knowledge himself; it is not
a commodity that can be passed from hand to hand,
but can only be awakened" (SBCJ 8) in the soul of the
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questioner, which is inseparable from a developing
sense of self-awareness. This self-awareness includes
the ever-deepening understanding of the individual's
relation to the Being of the virtues and their proper
place in a good and just life.
What is ultimately called for, Jaspers argues,
as drawn from his reading of Plato, is the crucial
understanding of the relationship between fundamental
knowledge and finite ways of knowing the world
along with our place within the world, and here, I
reiterate that the existential and everyday ways of
inhabiting the world are inseparable. Finite knowledge,
which is termed formable, objective, or propositional
knowledge, holds "consequences in the technically
governable world outside me and within me," however,
it does not function in such a way as to change or attune
my Being; "it brings about no transformation in its
possessor," and since it does not influence the soul or
disposition of its possessor, "it is neutral in regard to
good and evil, it can be used and misused" (PA 20). It
is ultimately fundamental knowledge that gives "finite
knowledge its guidance and so dispels its neutrality"
(PA 20). Jaspers brings the reader's attention to an
incident recounted in the Charmides that expresses the
idea of the crucial difference between the fundamental
knowledge of good and evil as it differs from both
techne and episteme as expressed by Plato through
Socrates' dream of the perfect technological state,
which although efficient and productive, is bereft of an
authentic sense of morality without philosophy and the
understanding of good and evil, without which none of
the fine technological things will be done in an excellent
or good way (173a-174e).25
Fundamental Knowledge and the Unfolding of
the Dialectic: Dialectic as the Thought-Dynamic
of the Thinker Transforming Himself
Describing Plato's philosophical method as "dialecticas-dialogue," does not point out that Plato wrote
dialogues, but rather emphasizes that Jaspers views
the philosophical practice of interrogating as being the
essence of human arete in terms of an extended and
renewed conversation that unfolds through dialectic
interchange, a back-and-forth that deals with a refutation
(elenchus) that is directed toward a positive, albeit limited,
25

Plato, "Charmides," in Complete Works, ed. John M.
Cooper, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press
1997, pp. 639-663, here pp. 660-1.
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form of philosophical enlightenment. Jaspers' view is
related to contemporary phenomenological readings
of Plato inasmuch as that the dialectic is radically
unlike the scientific method and does not terminate in
the sure and certain grasp of truth that functions as a
product of dialectic unfolding, presumably standing
outside the interpretive process of questioning. Jaspers
calls the dialectic the "thought-dynamic of the thinker
who transforms himself in rising to higher knowledge"
(PA 35), and all insight of a higher existential order
requires the soul's turning to an enlightened state
(periagoge) and back to itself, which as Jaspers informs
us is an event inseparable from authentic education
(paideia) as it is conceived by Plato. This transformation
that comes from the outside, it is a variant of selfawareness, which indicates that knowledge cannot
be poured into a human being as if one were an
empty vessel, nor is it a change that can be expressed
in and through the accomplishment of definitive and
quantifiable objectives, as it would be consistent with a
systematized or standardized education. The periagoge
unique to the dialectic is an experience or event of
enlightenment through the revelation of fundamental
knowledge that inspires a change to one's Being, soul,
or disposition (hexis). Thus, the dialectic "does not bring
knowledge of a new object which we then apprehend,
but aspires with the help of the idea to transform our
conscious being" (WTW 31). This view of the experience
of fundamental knowledge, the abrupt presence of the
lighted flame of truth in the midst of the dialectic's
unfolding (the Augenblick), defies dogmatic readings
of Plato's dialectic, for it is directed, much like Plato's
thought in its entirety, toward the "attempt to fashion an
instrument for the communication of an independently
achieved awareness of being—not a self-sufficient body
of objective knowledge" (PA 42).
The dialectic embodies an "ascending movement
and thinking in being itself," a "dynamic that directs us
forward" as we hold ourselves within the vacillations
of the precarious, unpredictable, and difficult unfolding
of the interpretive "circular movement of speculation"
(PA 35-6). Contrary to the doctrinal reading of Plato,
where the hypothetical method culminates in the
noetic method and the absolute grasp of indelible
truths—propositional or axiomatic—Jaspers proposes
a unique understanding of the dialectic that is nondoctrinal in nature. The dialectics movement, which is
focused on winnowing out false or questionable beliefs,
interrogating untested opinions, and loosening the
hold of dogmatic views, unfolds through interpretive
Volume 12, No. 2, Fall 2017
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activity that refutes and is eristic in the effort to arrive at
positions that demonstrate temporary veracity through
reasoned communal consensus, a form of warranted
assertions, which is always open for reinterpretation
through new and renewed lines of questioning. It is
possible to understand the dialectic as comprising
three repeatable stages or moments as described
by Jaspers: (1) We consider the presuppositions
grounding our beliefs and claims to truth, (2) We form
hypotheses in order to test those views regarding
those presuppositions and claims, and (3) We work
toward wresting from concealment the fundamental
knowledge that provides a glimpse into the hitherto
unseen and unknown ground or arche of those original
presuppositions, which locates Plato's Socrates and his
interlocutors, through the making present of the truth,
in the existential proximity of the Being of the virtue
that is interrogated (BTC 167-8). Jaspers expresses the
goal of the dialectic as the attempt "to think back to the
beginning that precedes all presuppositions" and begins
by attending to presuppositions that are neither viewed
nor classified as "absolutely first and highest," but rather
draws from these presuppositions in order to form
hypotheses that serve as the dialectician's footing, the
"steps mounting to that which has no presupposition,
the beginning (arche) of the whole" (PA 37). Then, as
opposed to stopping and jettisoning the method—as
would be consistent with a doctrinal reading of Plato—
once the dialectic reveals the partial presence of arche,
it descends again, "retaining everything that is related
to the beginning" (PA 37). Whatever has been revealed
in the fleeting moment of truth, disregards everything
false and questionable, since opinions and beliefs are
revealed in a new and clarifying light of truth and as
such have been winnowed out.
To further the discussion relating to the three
moments of the dialectic, I focus on the authentic place
or topos of a human being within this unfolding process,
and Jaspers names this locale, this context of dwelling,
the "between." The dialectic, according to Jaspers,
unfolds as it is situated, and here we must include the
human condition in its essence, in-between opposing
and contradictory ways-of-Being, for example, Being
and non-Being: "Contradiction becomes a spur to
motion, the medium in which opposites occur," within
which "a ‘driving power toward being' is experienced"
(PA 38). Thought is always occurring and kindled by
the encounter with oppositions and the movement
between them that is the hallmark of Plato's dialectic
for Jaspers. It is the task of the philosopher, according
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to Plato, to mediate the realm of opposites, and it is
through and within the unfolding of the dialectic that
this mediation occurs, where "separates are joined,
whereby the one is present in the other or has a share
in it" (PA 37). The notion of the "between" in relation to
Plato's philosophy and Plato's Socrates as philosopher
can be understood in the following way: A human
being is set out, or better, stretched out, between full
knowledge (Being) and absolute ignorance (nonBeing), and navigates this realm by mediating it, while
participating in both extremes and finding the middle
ground or the "between."26 As philosopher one is in
a sense condemned to this realm, for although one
always seeks to exist beyond the state of non-knowing,
and hence avoids falling victim to dwelling within
ignorance, the full disclosure of truth remains elusive,
the full revelation of the Being of the virtues pursued
remains shrouded in mystery, due to certain aspects of
the idealized and perfected vision of their essence.
Indeed, as stated earlier in relation to philosophieren,
Jaspers believes that it is essential to embrace and
shelter this mystery, for we recognize that in "the
clearest communication of his thoughts…the mystery
of philosophical endeavor becomes speech while
remaining always present as mystery" (WTW 177). It
for this reason that Plato incorporates in addition to
the logoi, myths and hypothetical thought exercises that
Socrates regularly practices attempting to communicate
through intimation and gesture what the truth of Being
might be like. Here, it is possible to understand Jaspers'
concept of ciphers in terms of Plato's unique and poietic
way of gesturing towards or intimating existential
understanding that cannot be articulated in everyday
modes of language. "Ciphers (Chiffreschrift)," as Filiz
Peach informs us, are "intuitive symbols," which are,
however irreducible to symbols, this is so because
"symbols objectify what they symbolize, where as
ciphers do not," and so, in a sense, speak the language
26

Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, transl.
Michael Chase, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press 2002, pp. 39-51. Hadot offers an interesting
analysis of this realm of the "between" in Platonic
philosophy by turning to Diotima's teaching in the
Symposium (23c-d), where there is focus on the
crucial difference between Socratic ignorance and
base ignorance when compared to the all-knowing
immortal gods. Here, too we encounter the notion
of philosophy being stretched out between and
mediating—much like Eros—the realm of base
ignorance and divine omniscience.
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of the mystery (DDE 41). Ciphers, we might say, serve
as the authentic language of the between, which a
true philosopher seeks to inhabit when pursuing
the ethical life, and by working tirelessly through the
ever-renewing stages of the dialectic, by repeatedly
interpreting and re-interpreting one's findings, with
the purpose of clarifying the knowledge that has been
temporarily brought to stand through the dialogic and
interrogative processes.
Since Jaspers refers to the dialectic as the thought
dynamic within which the thinker transforms himself,
it is necessary to attempt to elucidate the moment
of turning (periagoge), of transformation to the soul
(disposition), which is the event of the revelation of
fundamental knowledge in the midst of the dialectic's
unfolding, facilitating the moment of enlightenment.
In straightforward terms, Jaspers refers to this as an
event of learning, and it is the case that in the moments
of truth's flashing forth, those who participate in the
dialectic actually do learn, their understanding of the
subject of their interrogation is deepened, and their
Being or disposition transforms—a turning of the
soul back toward itself and enlightened (periagoge)—
in the presence of fundamental knowledge of the
virtues, they become virtuous. Reading the moment
of truth's revelation in terms of the Augenblick in a
phenomenological way, is consistent with what Peach
terms the "existential interpretation" of the Augenblick
(DDE 124-8).27 On this understanding, the Augenblick
might be said to represent the moment of revelation
where there is an experience of a "subjective existential
moment in objective time," an existential experience
"when one's awareness of Being is most acute" (DDE
27

The basic distinction Peach makes between mystical
and existential readings of the Augenblick centers on
the notion of eternity in Jaspers' philosophy as related
to death, deathlessness, Existenz, and Transcendence.
In the "mystical reading," Being is eternal, and "since
there is no dichotomy in Being," it is possible, upon
death, to speak about one's Existenz as "the individual
consciousness is absorbed in this ultimate reality
and returns to its original source which is infinite
and eternal," as becoming both eternal and timeless
and "thereby deathless." Since Jaspers does not
endorse the individual persisting after death, the
"mystical interpretation does not represent Jaspers'
metaphysical thinking in this respect," and so Peach
argues that interpreters should turn to the "existential
reading" of the Augenblick in relation to death and
deathlessness (DDE 123-7).
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127), when the individual moves into existential
proximity to Being, "‘touching' the transcendent
realm as it were" (DDE 128). This is precisely what
Jaspers claims about the illumination of fundamental
knowledge in the dialectic, which occurs at a "point
where suddenly, in a single moment, the good itself,
true being, that which surpasses comprehension and
can never be captured, is present to the insight" (PA
43). This indicates that in the Augenblick the Being of
the virtue reveals itself, a moment of unconcealment
occurs, and through a momentary crack, or renting
of the veil of everyday experience, the light of
fundamental knowledge shines through—nourishing
the soul. And because participation in this event is
transformative, as an event of periagoge, it is ecstatic,
in that the participants are attuned and transported,
they momentarily transcend or stand outside objective
modes of cognizing and relating to their experience of
the world and others.28 In this way, as Peach observes,
a human being "has an awareness of the transcendental
dimension in human existence," and it is a moment
within which it is possible to experience an awakening
to one's authentic selfhood (DDE 132). At the moment
of the Augenblick, when participants in the dialectic
are transported into the presence of the Being of the
virtues, they move into closer existential proximity to
a perfected form of knowledge, while at once attuned
to the understanding that the distance between limited
human wisdom and a perfected idealized omniscience
can never be fully traversed and closed, for Being
always recedes from full-concealment, forever retains
its essence as mystery.
Jaspers contends: "If good and the Ideas cannot
be taught directly, they can be fostered in dialectical
thinking" (PA 42). To conclude this section and to
28

In line with our non-doctrinal Plato, challenging
the traditional view espousing a two-world
metaphysics and the absolute divide between
reality and appearance, this moment of existential
insight does not transport the individual beyond
the everyday world—it is not an otherworldly
(supra-sensuous) experience—rather, because the
two realms are inseparable, it opens our everyday
ways of understanding the world to the momentary
experience of the existential-transcendent aspects of
our Being-in-the-world. So, the Augenblick is an event
that ultimately enhances and enriches our everyday
experiences, in the precise way Jaspers claims that
the revelation of fundamental knowledge enhances
all modes of formable knowing.
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reiterate a crucial point unique to Jaspers' early nondoctrinal interpretation of Plato, the insight into what
I have referred to as the Being of virtue occurring in the
dialectic happens only in and through the interpretive
activity itself—and never as a product (ergon) that
stands outside and apart from the process—for
as stated, within the presence of the fundamental
knowledge of justice, we become just, and the same
might be said of wisdom, piety, sophrosune, and
courage. So, in essence virtue is instantiated through
the dialectic activity itself as one is enlightened in the
encounter with fundamental knowledge of the virtue
as it is being interrogated. This calls for Socrates and
his interlocutors to hold themselves in the unfolding
dialectic-as-dialogue
despite
the
difficulties
encountered. Where other interpreters, such as
Francisco Gonzalez and Sean Kirkland, have rightly
stressed the difficulty, danger, and pain of such an
endeavor, Jaspers stresses several unique and crucial
qualities of the soul or disposition necessary in order to
inspire and push the dialectic forward—in a protreptic
manner—that are worth mentioning: The ability to
listen and good manners, which includes releasing
ourselves over to the other in order to allow the other
to be seen the best possible light. What I recognize as
the humane component of dialectic communication
is expressed by Waugh in the following terms:
"Communication or dialogue [always] takes place
between what is other-than-objects" (JOP 76). When
an individual is open to listening to another one, he
is at once "open to persuasion" and refuses to believe
that he is "in the ultimate possession of truth" (PA 24).
To embrace epistemic limitations with a healthy dose
of skepticism includes the attunement to an authentic
sense of Socratic ignorance, being aware that we do
not know, and beyond, demonstrating an eagerness
to further develop our understanding of things, for
Plato recognizes that "Socrates always sought to
provoke the knowledge of non-knowledge" (PA 27).
For all dogmatic and purely polemical attitudes are the
enemies of true dialectic-as-dialogue, which lives and
thrives only within a context framed by candor and the
"attitude of benevolence toward the other" in the effort
to improve in a therapeutic manner the other's soul,
and this is why as the "art of purification," the dialectic
"opens the way to knowledge by showing men what
they do not know," for those who believe they know
"refuse to learn" (PA 25), refuse to enter into the dialectic
in search of fundamental knowledge.
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Concluding Thoughts
Jaspers' analyses of Plato and Socrates, despite
their brevity, add valuable philosophical insights
to Platonic studies. For example, Jaspers' use of
ciphers and their relationship to myths and thought
experiments that Socrates carried out; and in general,
the manner in which ciphers relate to Plato's literary
choice of writing dialogues as opposed to formal
treaties, a theme that is prevalent in Waugh's studies
of Plato.29 I have briefly touched upon how Jaspers'
work relates in a phenomenological manner to the
evolving scholarship in Continental thought in order
to bring attention to the uniqueness and prescient
nature of Jaspers' pioneering work on Plato. Jaspers'
contributions to the phenomenological tradition
deserve to be acknowledged and critically reviewed
so that they further inspire the re-thinking, or reconceptualization, of Plato's philosophy in order to
accord an explicit presence to Jaspers in future readings
that seek to transcend analytic and doctrinal norms
in the interpretation of Plato's work. It is noteworthy
that Heidegger also provides phenomenological
interpretations of both Plato and, in a far more limited
way, Socrates. Currently, scholars disagree as to
whether Heidegger's Plato is doctrinal or not, I claim
that his reading of the so-called historical and protophenomenological Socrates (but not Heidegger's
Plato) is decidedly reminiscent of the portrait of
Jaspers' non-doctrinal Plato.30 My speculative reading
29

For example, Joanne Waugh, "Socrates and the
Character of Platonic Dialogue," in Who Speaks for
Plato? Studies in Platonic Anonymity, ed. Gerald A.
Press, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
pp. 39-53.

30

James M. Magrini, Re-Conceptualizing Plato's Socrates
at the Limits of Education: A Socratic Curriculum
Grounded in Finite Human Transcendence, New York,
NY: Routledge 2017, pp. 49-59. In line with Francisco
Gonzalez, I also interpret Heidegger as embracing and
espousing a decidedly doctrinal reading of Plato. This
Heideggerian vision of Plato in relation to the first
beginning of philosophy is perhaps most (in)famously
articulated and expressed in a detailed manner by
Heidegger in "Plato's Doctrine of Truth." Indeed,
as related to what was stated above, in What Calls
for Thinking? Heidegger's interpretation of Socrates
bears a striking resemblance to Heidegger himself;
a pure ontological thinker who stands at a radical
remove from any form of philosophy that might be
systematized. However, the question of whether or
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of Jaspers embraces a phenomenological approach
that additionally demonstrates, as in Waugh's
understanding, a "hermeneutical conception of
philosophy," which she argues, applies, or is at least
related, to Jaspers himself (JOP 72). This essay does not
attempt to serve as an exposition or exegesis proper
not Heidegger's so-called doctrinal reading of Plato
is comparable to the doctrinal and systematic view of
Plato commonly found in the interpretations of the
analytic tradition, is something of an ongoing point
of contention in Heidegger scholarship. For example,
see Robert Bernasconi, The Question of Language in
Heidegger's History of Being, Amherst, NY: Humanity
Books, 1985.
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of Jaspers' thoughts, however, I believe that Jaspers
would view this precise type of speculative reading as
continuing the tradition of thinking-and-writing that
can be experienced in Plato's philosophy when he is
perceived as a non-doctrinal thinker. For according to
Jaspers, speaking to my point, Plato "attached great
importance to dialectic speculation but recognized its
failure when it strove to become conclusive and ultimate
knowledge" (PA 51-2).
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